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Abstract 
This paper analyses whether directors should owe a duty to 
understand their companies’ tax planning, and if so, what this duty 
should look like and whether this duty could successfully be 
implemented into New Zealand law.  This paper then assesses whether 
it is in fact appropriate to impose on directors a duty to understand tax 
planning by comparing this duty to directors’ obligations and 
liabilities in other areas of regulation.  Finally, this paper concludes 
that directors should owe a duty to understand their companies’ tax 
planning, but that this duty would be difficult to implement into New 
Zealand law.   
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The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes 
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I Introduction  
The nature of directors’ responsibilities in regard to their companies’ 
tax planning has been the subject of much discussion and debate.  This 
discussion has focused both on outlining what is expected of directors 
in regard to their companies’ tax strategies and, more generally, on 
encouraging directors to take responsibility for their companies’ 
approach in the tax sphere.1  For example, the Director of the Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration at the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has noted that there is “an 
issue of the Board’s responsibility to assess the financial and 
reputation risks associated with any particular tax strategy.”2  The 
OECD has suggested that directors, when reviewing tax planning 
strategies, should “understand the major tax issues and their 
implications, establish reporting procedures, oversee taxes paid, and 
are aware of the tax jurisdictions and laws in which the company 
operates.”3  Tax authorities have also expressed their opinions on what 
they expect of directors.  For example, the Australian Commissioner 
of Taxation has encouraged directors to recognise the need for a tax 
management strategy as part of their companies’ governance 
frameworks,4 and the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) has 
commented that, “we don’t expect directors and senior managers to be 
tax experts, but there are some issues they may want to focus on.”
5
   
These comments demonstrate that there is an expectation that 
directors will focus on and take responsibility for their companies’ tax 
planning.  The difficulty, however, is that this expectation is not 
binding on directors.  That is, this expectation does not create an 
enforceable legal obligation on the part of directors in regard to their 
companies’ tax planning.  This paper will therefore look at whether 
directors should owe legal duties in regard to their companies’ tax 
planning.  Specifically, this paper will look at whether directors 
should owe a duty to understand their companies’ tax planning, and if 
so, what this duty should look like and whether this duty could 
                                                        
1 David Patterson “Tax Governance – Practitioners advising Boards and Audit and Risk Sub-
Committees” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society – Tax Conference, September 
2011) 65 at 67.  
2 Jeffrey Owens “Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension” in Wolfgang Schon (ed) 
Tax and Corporate Governance (Springer, 2008) 9 at 10.   
3 OECD Forum on tax administration – Information Note, General Administrative Principles: 
Corporate governance and tax risk management (July 2009) at 10.  
4 Michael D'Ascenzo, Commissioner of Taxation “What's tax got to do with it?” (speech to 
the Australian Institute of Company Directors, Sydney, 16 February, 2010). 
5 Inland Revenue Department Compliance Focus 2010-2011 (August 2010) at 25.  
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successfully be implemented into New Zealand law.  A duty to 
understand tax planning would help ensure that directors focus on and 
take responsibility for their companies’ tax planning because it would 
both ensure that directors are better informed about their companies’ 
tax planning and provide a mechanism to make directors accountable 
for their companies’ tax planning when they breach this duty by 
failing to understand this tax planning.   
This paper is structured into three main parts.  Part 2 evaluates 
whether directors should owe a duty to understand tax planning.  This 
part briefly sets out both the directors’ role and the directors’ 
relationship with their companies and then looks at the importance of 
tax planning to companies and the nature of directors’ involvement in 
their companies’ tax planning.  Part 3 then examines how a duty to 
understand tax planning could be implemented.  This part identifies 
two possible avenues for implementing this duty, namely: by fitting 
this duty within one of the existing directors’ duties in the Companies 
Act 1993; or alternatively by Parliament enacting a separate statutory 
duty.  Part 4 looks at whether it is appropriate to have a duty that 
requires directors to understand their companies’ tax planning.  This 
part evaluates the appropriateness of the duty by considering the 
reasonableness of this duty and comparing it to directors’ obligations 
and liability in other areas of regulation.  Part 5 then sets out the 
conclusions.   
II Why Should Directors be Required to Understand 
Tax Planning? 
This part of the paper identifies three reasons why directors should be 
required to understand their companies’ tax planning, namely: tax 
planning is an important matter to companies; directors make 
decisions about their companies’ tax planning; and finally requiring 
directors to understand tax planning increases directors’ accountability 
for their companies’ tax planning.   
A The Directors’ Role and Relationship With Their 
Companies 
It is important to appreciate the directors’ role and relationship with 
their companies before looking at the reasons why directors should be 
required to understand their companies’ tax planning.  It is important 
to appreciate the directors’ role and relationship because it explains 
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both why directors make decisions about their companies’ tax 
planning and why the directors companies’ and these companies’ 
shareholders might be interested in ensuring that directors understand 
tax planning.   
Companies are required to appoint at least one director.
6
  The 
director or directors of the company act as a board of directors,7 and 
as a board, is responsible for managing, or supervising the 
management of, the business and affairs of the company.8  This 
responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the company is 
exercised on behalf of the company’s shareholders.  The company’s 
shareholders hold one or more shares in the company9 and are 
therefore the owners of the company.  The company’s directors are 
thus accountable to the shareholders for the management of the 
company’s property.10  
The directors’ relationship with their companies highlights that 
there is a separation between the people that manage the company (the 
directors) and the people that own the company (the shareholders).  
This separation explains why shareholders might be interested in 
ensuring that the directors of their companies understand their 
companies’ tax planning.  The directors’ role also highlights that 
directors can confer the management of the company on persons other 
than the directors.  This means that there might in some situations be a 
distinction between the company’s directors and management.  This 
distinction might affect who is responsible for making decisions about 
tax planning.   
B Tax Planning is An Important Matter to Companies 
Tax planning is a sufficiently important matter to companies to 
require directors to understand it.  Tax planning is important to 
companies for a number of reasons.  First, tax planning can have a 
significant impact on a company’s profits.  It both makes up a 
significant portion of a company’s before-tax profits (for example, the 
basic income tax rate for companies in New Zealand is 28 per cent on 
                                                        
6 Companies Act 1993, s 10(d).  
7 Section 127. 
8 Section 128. 
9 Section 96. 
10 Andrew Beck and others Morison’s Company Law (looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [23.1]. 
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each dollar of the company’s taxable income11) and can be used to 
manipulate the size of the company’s after-tax profits.   
Companies are able to arrange their financial affairs so as to 
minimise their tax obligations because income tax law suffers from 
ectopia.
12
  This problem is unique to income tax law.  Ectopia refers to 
the dislocation between income tax law and the economic gains that 
are its target.13  These economic gains exist naturally and 
independently of income tax law.14  Income tax law taxes some of 
these gains, but not all of them.15  Therefore, income tax law has rules 
and categories to define what gains are taxed.  An example of a rule is 
that countries place geographical limits on the gains that they tax.16  
Another example is that income tax law divides these gains into 
segments by reference to time.
17
  The time period chosen is invariably 
12 months.18  The consequence of the ectopic nature of income tax 
law is that it is impossible to construct a perfect income tax system.19  
That is, the income tax system fails to tax all gains that Parliament 
intended should be taxed.20  There remain gains (which Parliament 
intended should be captured) that cannot adequately be captured by 
the income tax law.21  The incompleteness of the tax system, and in 
particular the rules which are used to distinguish gains that are taxed 
from gains that are not taxed, provides opportunities for taxpayers to 
arrange their financial affairs in a manner so as to minimise their tax 
obligations.    
Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue
22 provides an example that illustrates how tax planning can 
be used to manipulate the size of the company’s profits.  In this case, 
Westpac used its tax planning to influence its reported after-tax 
profits.  This case concerned several structured financing transactions 
                                                        
11 Income Tax Act 2007, sch 1, cl 2. 
12 John Prebble “Ectopia, Formalism, and Anti-Avoidance Rules in Income Tax Law” in W. 
Krawietz and others (eds) Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal 
Systems (Duncker and Humblot, 1994) 367 at 379. 
13 John Prebble “Ectopia, Tax Law and International Taxation” (1997) 5 B.T.R. 383 at 383.  
14 Kevin Holmes The Concept of Income: A multi-disciplinary analysis (IBFD Publications, 
Amsterdam, 2001) at 237.  
15 Above n 12, at 384. 
16 At 385. 
17 At 375. 
18 At 375. 
19 At 380. 
20 At 382. 
21 At 381.  
22 Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] 2 NZLR 709 
(HC).  
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that Westpac had entered into.  These transactions utilised either the 
conduit tax regime or the foreign tax credit regime in the Income Tax 
Act 2007.  These transactions could potentially reduce Westpac’s 
reported tax expense.  This is because Westpac was entitled to claim 
deductions for its expenses in relation to these transactions but did not 
have to pay income tax on these transactions (because the income was 
exempt income).  Westpac was able to manipulate and optimise its 
effective tax rate through its tax planning.  Westpac’s effective tax 
rate is the ratio of its accounting tax expense to its before-tax net 
profits (prepared for financial reporting purposes on a group basis).  It 
measures the amount of tax that Westpac pays as a percentage of its 
reported before-tax net profits.23  Thus, the lower Westpac’s effective 
tax rate, the higher its reported after-tax net profit.  Westpac’s annual 
target was an effective tax rate ranging between 20 per cent and 30 per 
cent, which Westpac believed was broadly in line with its competitors 
and other major corporates.24  Notwithstanding, Westpac’s 
management progressively allowed the effective tax rate to fall25 and 
the growth of these transactions caused a steady decline in Westpac’s 
effective tax rate.26  This continued to the point that Westpac was 
recommended to pay NZD 30,000,000 to NZD 40,000,000 in tax, 
even though that sum represented an effective tax rate of only 6.5 per 
cent against the bank’s reported profit.27 
Tax planning can also have an impact on the share value of listed 
companies.  This is because tax planning can have an impact on the 
size of the dividends that companies will distribute to its shareholders.  
If tax planning is used to influence a company’s profits, then this will 
impact on how much profit is available to the company to distribute to 
its shareholders as dividends.  If the company maintains its share 
value by paying regular dividends to shareholders and these dividends 
are different to what was expected then this might have an impact on 
the company’s share value. 
Furthermore, a company’s tax planning can harm the company’s 
reputation.  This risk was identified in the Westpac case.  Harrison J 
noted on several occasions in his judgment that Westpac’s 
management acknowledged the reputational risk associated with 
                                                        
23 Westpac, above n 22, at [88].  
24 At [88]. 
25 At [554]. 
26 At [555]. 
27 At [564].  
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Westpac’s tax policies.  His Honour noted that, “consideration of 
‘reputational risk’ was always at the forefront of [the Westpac] group 
tax policies.”28  His Honour then noted that:29 
 
Mr Mataira [Westpac’s head of New Zealand group tax] well understood 
the elements of the Koch transaction. He believed that they accorded with 
Westpac group’s tax policy; that they complied with all legal 
requirements; and that they did not ‘threaten the [b]ank’s reputation as a 
good corporate citizen’. 
 
Harrison J also noted that:
30
  
 
Westpac was always conscious of its [effective tax rate]. The bank was 
anxious not to reduce it unduly because of its reputational effect; it 
wanted to appear as a good corporate citizen paying a responsible level of 
tax. For that reason, Westpac’s chief executive officer imposed a 
minimum [effective tax rate] for the Westpac group of 25% in 1997. 
 
It appears that Starbucks also recognised the impact that its tax 
planning had on its corporate image.  This is illustrated by the fact that 
Starbucks said that it would pay £10,000,000 of United Kingdom 
corporation tax31 in response to criticism that it had been avoiding 
paying tax in the United Kingdom.
32
  Starbucks said in a statement 
that:33 
 
[W]e listened to our customers in December and so decided to forgo 
certain deductions which would make us liable to pay 10 million pounds 
in corporation tax this year and a further 10 million pounds in 2014. 
 
Finally, a company’s tax planning can have an impact on the 
likelihood that the IRD will find an issue with the company’s tax 
position and challenge that position.  If the IRD finds that the 
company has filed an incorrect tax position then the company can be 
                                                        
28 Westpac, above n 22, at [86]. 
29 At [109]. 
30 At [554]. 
31 Kamal Ahmed “Starbucks pays first tax since 2008” The Telegraph (online ed, Kent, 22 
June 2013). 
32 Terry Macalister “Starbucks pays corporation tax in UK for first time in five years” The 
Guardian (online ed, London, 23 June 2013).  
33 Macalister, above n 32. 
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exposed to financial consequences such as use of money interest and 
shortfall penalties.    
C Directors Make Decisions About Their Companies’ Tax 
Planning 
There is evidence that directors make decisions about their 
companies’ tax planning.  Directors are encouraged to focus on tax 
issues34 and the board is generally responsible for a company’s tax 
strategy and overseeing its implementation.35  Directors also actively 
review and approve their companies’ tax planning.  Freedman, 
Loomer and Vella looked at the findings of a United Kingdom survey 
of tax directors conducted in the first half of 2008.36  The authors 
noted that a majority of the interviewees’ companies had a tax policy 
or tax strategy and almost all of these policies or strategies were 
approved by their companies’ board of directors.37  The authors also 
noted that a majority of the interviewees said that their companies’ 
board (or board committee) is involved at some stage in the decision-
making or review processes relating to these tax policies or 
strategies.
38
  
Directors should be required to understand their companies’ tax 
planning because they make decisions about this tax planning.  
Directors need to understand tax planning to be able to properly 
contribute to these decisions.  Directors would be able to properly 
contribute because they would be better informed about the tax 
planning.   This argument is supported by Miller J’s comments in 
Davidson v Registrar of Companies
39 about what knowledge is 
required of directors of finance companies.  This case is one of several 
cases that resulted from the collapse of several finance companies in 
New Zealand between 2007 and 2008.  The Financial Markets 
Authority (and before 1 May 2011, the Securities Commission) and 
Serious Fraud Office launched investigations into these failed 
companies and this resulted in charges being laid against the directors 
and officers of several of these companies.   Miller J stated that:40 
                                                        
34 Above n 5, at 25.  
35 Above n 1, at 65. 
36 Judith Freedman and others “Corporate Tax Risk and Tax Avoidance: New Approaches” 
(2009) 1 B.T.R. 74 at 84. 
37 At 84. 
38 At 85.  
39 Davidson v Registrar of Companies [2011] 1 NZLR 542 (HC). 
40 Davidson, above n 39, at [121]. 
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[A] degree of financial literacy is required of any director of a finance 
company. Without it, Mr Davidson could scarcely understand the 
business, let alone contribute to policy decisions affecting risk 
management and monitor the company‘s performance… 
 
Though Miller J’s comment relates specifically to the directors of 
finance companies, this comment can also be construed more 
generally.  The general proposition here is that directors need a degree 
of knowledge about the activities that their companies’ partake in, in 
order to be able to both understand their companies’ businesses and 
contribute to their companies’ policy decisions.  In this case, this 
means that directors of finance companies need a degree of financial 
literacy to be able to both contribute to their companies’ policy 
decisions and properly monitor their companies’ affairs.  In the case 
of companies that engage in tax planning, this means that directors 
need to understand their companies’ tax planning to be able to 
contribute to their companies’ policy decisions about this tax 
planning. 
D Increases Directors’ Accountability For Their Companies’ 
Tax Planning 
If there is no legal requirement that directors understand their 
companies’ tax planning then there might be no repercussions for a 
director that fails to understand this tax planning.  Therefore, requiring 
directors to understand their companies’ tax planning would increase 
their accountability for this tax planning because it would provide a 
legal mechanism to make directors responsible for when they fail to 
understand this tax planning.  That is, requiring directors to 
understand this tax planning imposes on directors an enforceable 
obligation in regard to their companies’ tax planning.    
III How Could a Duty to Understand Tax Planning be 
Implemented?  
Part 2 of this paper established that directors should be required to 
understand their companies’ tax planning.  To give this requirement 
legal standing it needs to be implemented into law.  This part of the 
paper therefore examines how a duty to understand tax planning could 
be implemented into law by looking at whether this duty could fit 
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within one of the existing directors’ duties in the Companies Act, or 
alternatively, whether Parliament would enact a separate statutory 
duty to understand tax planning.   
A Does This Duty Fit Within One Of the Existing Statutory 
Directors’ Duties?  
For simplicity, this part of the paper focuses only on the statutory 
directors’ duties in New Zealand.  In New Zealand, there is no 
statutory directors’ duty to understand the company’s tax planning.  
Therefore, it is necessary to look whether this duty might fit within 
one of the existing directors’ duties in the Companies Act.  There are 
two possible statutory duties that this duty might fit within: the duty to 
act in good faith and in the best interests of the company (s 131) and 
the duty to exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill (s 137).   In 
assessing whether this duty might fit within one, or both of these 
sections, it is necessary to consider the scope of these statutory duties 
and also the likelihood that a court would find that the duty to 
understand tax planning fits within one of these duties.   
1 Section 137 
Section 137 sets out that:41 
 
A director of a company, when exercising powers or performing duties as 
a director, must exercise the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonable 
director would exercise in the same circumstances taking into account, 
but without limitation,— 
(a) the nature of the company; and 
(b) the nature of the decision; and 
(c) the position of the director and the nature of the responsibilities 
undertaken by him or her. 
 
Section 137 establishes a statutory duty of care.  The standard of care 
expected of directors is based on the reasonable director. Thus, the 
director’s knowledge and experience is not relevant.
42
   However, this 
section provides that in assessing whether the standard of care has 
been met the court may take into account the nature of the company, 
the nature of the decision, and the position of the director and the 
nature of responsibilities undertaken.  This introduces an element of 
                                                        
41 Companies Act, s 137.   
42 Brookers Company Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CA137.01]. 
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subjectivity to the assessment.  Therefore, the court would look at a 
reasonable director in the particular circumstances of the case.
43
 
There are several reasons to indicate that a court would consider 
reading the standard of care expected of directors as including a 
requirement that directors understand their companies’ tax planning.  
First, the interpretation of the standard of care expected of directors is 
arguably broad enough to include a requirement that directors 
understand their companies’ tax planning.  For example, the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal, in a leading case on the director’s duty 
of care, Daniels v AWA Ltd, proposed that the minimum standard of 
care expected of all directors requires that directors, among other 
things, acquire a basic understanding of the business of the company, 
be familiar with the fundamentals of the company’s business,
44
 and 
are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities 
of the company.45  It is arguable that a requirement that directors 
acquire a basic understanding of the business of the company is broad 
enough to include a requirement that directors understand the tax 
planning of the company.  Though the expression “the business of the 
company” might on its face appear to refer primarily to the company’s 
operations or trading activities (for example, a bank’s operations is to 
offer financial products, services, and advice to businesses and 
individuals) it is arguable that this expression also refers to the 
company’s tax planning.  This is so because tax planning is 
inextricably linked to the company’s operations.  Tax planning is a 
necessary consequence of the company’s operations: it arises out of a 
company’s obligation to pay tax, and this obligation to pay tax arises 
when a company engages in profitable activities.  That is, there will 
always be some kind of tax planning if a company’s trading activities 
are profitable and so the company has an obligation to pay tax.  
Therefore, tax planning should also be considered part of the 
“business of the company” because it is so entwined in the company’s 
operations.   
This argument is also supported by the fact that the similar 
expression “the business of the company and its affairs” used in s 128 
of the Companies Act includes both the company’s trading activities, 
and also the company’s internal and administrative management 
                                                        
43 Brookers, above n 42, at [CA137.01]. 
44 Daniels v AWA Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 (CA) at 61.  
45 At 61.   
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decisions.46  It thus follows that the expression “the business of the 
company” used by the New South Wales Court of Appeal should also 
refer to both the company’s trading activities and the company’s 
internal or administrative activities.  Tax planning is an example of an 
internal or administrative activity.   
Furthermore, the fact that the construction of s 137 means that the 
standard of care expected of directors depends on, among other things, 
the nature of the decision and the nature of the responsibilities 
undertaken,47 suggests that if directors are making decisions in regard 
to their companies’ tax planning, then a court would, taking into 
account the nature of these decisions, expect that these directors, in 
exercising the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonable director 
would exercise in the same circumstances, understand their 
companies’ tax planning.  This argument is supported by Miller J’s 
comment in Davidson (this comment was referred to earlier in this 
paper but is stated again for ease of reference) that:48 
 
[A] degree of financial literacy is required of any director of a finance 
company. Without it, Mr Davidson could scarcely understand the 
business, let alone contribute to policy decisions affecting risk 
management and monitor the company‘s performance… 
 
Miller J’s comment illustrates that the standard of care expected of 
directors requires that directors understand the particular aspects of 
their companies that they are involved in and make decisions about.  
To apply this comment to tax planning, this means that directors that 
are involved in, and make decisions about, their companies tax 
planning need to understand that tax planning to meet the standard of 
care expected of them.   
However, there is a difficulty in trying to apply s 137 to tax 
planning.  This difficulty undermines the likelihood that a court would 
read the standard of care expected of directors as including a 
requirement that directors understand their companies’ tax planning.  
This difficulty relates to the fact that the standard of care expected of 
directors flows from the directors’ powers and duties.  There are two 
parts to the duty of care in s 137: directors must first be exercising 
                                                        
46 Brookers, above n 42, at [CA128.01]. 
47 Companies Act, s 137.  
48 Davidson, above n 3940, at [121]. 
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powers or performing duties as a director; and directors must then, 
when exercising these powers or performing these duties, exercise the 
care, diligence, and skill that a reasonable director would exercise in 
the same circumstances, taking into account the factors identified 
earlier in the paper.  For example, directors are exercising powers as 
directors when they, acting as a board of directors, decide to issue new 
shares49 or approve the buyback of the company’s shares.50  In these 
examples, the directors are exercising powers that are prescribed to 
them by legislation.  Ministry of Economic Development v Feeney 
(Feltex)
51
 provides another example that illustrates how this duty 
operates.  In this case, all five of Feltex Carpets Ltd’s directors faced 
charges under s 36A of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 relating to 
the accuracy of Feltex Carpet’s interim financial statements for the 
half year to 31 December 2005.  Section 36A(1) of the Financial 
Reporting Act requires any statement by, or on behalf of a reporting 
entity that contains, inter alia, interim financial information for the 
reporting entity to comply with any applicable financial reporting 
standards.  Judge Doogue held that when “dealing with a statement as 
referred to in [the Financial Reporting Act] s 36A, the director is 
exercising powers or performing duties as a director.”52  Therefore, it 
is appropriate to judge the conduct of directors by reference to what 
the Companies Act has to say how they may exercise powers and 
perform duties,53 including the standard of care set out in s 137.  Judge 
Doogue carefully articulated the relationship between the directors’ 
obligations in the Financial Reporting Act and the provisions in the 
Companies Act about the directors’ powers of management, their 
duties and how they may exercise powers and perform duties.  The 
problem in applying the duty of care in s 137 to tax planning is that it 
is not clear whether directors, when making decisions about their 
companies’ tax planning, are exercising powers or performing duties 
as a director.   There is no statutory power enabling directors to make 
decisions about their companies’ tax planning.  There is also (unlike 
the Feltex case, where the directors had a statutory obligation to 
ensure that any statement prepared by, or on behalf of, the reporting 
entity that contains interim financial information for the reporting 
                                                        
49 Companies Act, s 42.  
50 Companies Act, s 58.  
51 Ministry of Economic Development v Feeney (2010) 10 NZCLC 264,715 [Feltex].   
52 At [38]. 
53 At [34]. 
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entity complies with this section54) no statutory obligation that 
directors must make decisions about tax planning.  Therefore, it is 
arguable that the first part of the duty of care in s 137, which requires 
that directors must be exercising powers or performing duties as a 
director, is not satisfied in respect of decisions about tax planning.  
This means that decisions about tax planning do not fall within the 
scope of s 137 and therefore the standard of care set out in this section 
does not apply to these decisions.  The corollary is that even if the 
standard of care in s 137 includes a requirement that directors 
understand their companies’ tax planning, this requirement could 
never be applied to decisions about tax planning.  This would thus 
mean that it would be pointless to include in the standard of care 
expected of directors a requirement that directors understand tax 
planning.  This is because this requirement could never be applied to 
decisions about tax planning, even though this is the exact kind of 
situation that this requirement ought to be applied to.    
There are, however, two possible ways to mitigate this problem.  
First, companies could modify their constitutions to include a power 
enabling directors to make decisions about their companies’ tax 
planning.  This would mean that it is still helpful to include in the 
standard of care expected of directors a requirement that directors 
understand tax planning, because this requirement could in some 
situations be applied to decisions about tax planning, when the 
company has included in its constitution a power enabling its directors 
to make decisions about tax planning. 
Secondly, it is arguable that s 128 is broad enough to include a 
power to make decisions about tax planning.  This section gives the 
board of a company “all the powers necessary for managing, and for 
directing and supervising the management of, the business and affairs 
of the company.”55  The expression the “business and affairs of the 
company” includes both the company’s trading activities and the 
company’s internal and administrative management decisions.56 The 
expression is therefore broad enough to include the company’s tax 
planning.  This means that s 128 can be read as giving the board of a 
company all the powers necessary for managing, and for directing and 
supervising the management of, the company’s tax planning.  Thus, it 
                                                        
54 Financial Reporting Act 1993, s 36(3)(a). 
55 Companies Act, s 128(2). 
56 Brookers, above n 42, at [CA128.01]. 
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is arguable that even though there is no express statutory provision 
giving directors’ powers to make decisions about their companies’ tax 
planning, s 128 is broad enough to give directors’ powers to make 
decisions about tax planning.   
For these reasons, there is a strong argument that a court would 
read the standard of care expected of directors in s 137 as including a 
requirement that directors understand their companies’ tax planning.  
This interpretation of the standard of care is supported by the fact that 
reading the standard of care to require directors to understand tax 
planning is consistent with what the standard of care already requires 
of directors.  This interpretation is further supported by the fact that 
the standard of care can be applied to decisions about tax planning 
because s 128 indicates that when directors are making decisions 
about tax planning they exercising powers as directors.   
In the case that a court would not read the standard of care 
expected of directors as including a requirement that directors 
understand their companies’ tax planning, it is valuable to also look at 
whether the duty to understand tax planning might alternatively fit 
within s 131.  
2 Section 131 
Section 131 sets out that:
57
 
 
...[A] director of a company, when exercising powers or performing 
duties, must act in good faith and in what the director believes to be the 
best interests of the company. 
 
Directors have a duty to act in good faith and in what the director 
believes to be the best interests of the company.  It is arguable that it 
is in the best interests of the company that the company’s directors 
understand the company’s tax planning.  This is so because directors 
that understand this tax planning would be able to make better 
informed decisions about this tax planning.  Directors that understand 
tax planning might change their attitudes towards their companies’ tax 
planning, and consequently change their decisions about this tax 
planning.  Directors that understand tax planning might therefore 
decide that their companies should adopt different tax planning 
strategies.   
                                                        
57 Companies Act, s 131(1). 
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However, this argument is not convincing for several reasons.  
First, it does not necessarily follow that directors who understand their 
companies’ tax planning will make decisions that are in their 
companies’ best interests.  For example, directors who understand 
their companies’ tax planning might decide that their companies 
should take a conservative tax position.  Taking a conservative tax 
position will reduce the likelihood that the tax position is incorrect, 
and therefore reduce the likelihood that the IRD will find an issue 
with the tax position and challenge that position.  This challenge could 
expose the companies to financial costs such as use of money interest 
and shortfall penalties.  However, directors who understand their 
companies’ tax planning might still decide that their companies should 
take an aggressive tax position.  Taking an aggressive tax position will 
obviously increase the likelihood that the tax position is incorrect and 
will therefore be challenged by the IRD.  Taking this position would 
thus increase exposure to these financial costs.  This example 
demonstrates that directors who understand their companies’ tax 
planning might still make decisions that expose their companies to 
increased financial costs, and are therefore not in the companies’ best 
interests.    
Secondly, even if directors decide that their companies should take 
a conservative tax position, this decision is not necessarily in their 
companies’ best interests.  Though this decision might reduce 
exposure to financial costs such as shortfall penalties, this decision 
also means that these companies will pay more tax than they would 
have otherwise paid if they had adopted a more aggressive tax 
position.  Paying more tax is not in the company’s best interests 
because it reduces the company’s overall wealth, by reducing the 
company’s after-tax profit.   There is support for this argument that 
paying more tax is not in the company’s best interests (that is, it is in 
the company’s best interests to minimise the company’s tax 
obligation).  For example, in the Westpac case, Harrison J noted that it 
was “Mr Mataira’s view that the best interests of the bank and its 
shareholders were to pay as little New Zealand tax as legitimately 
possible.”58  Furthermore, the Privy Council in Mangin v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue noted that:59 
 
                                                        
58 Westpac, above n 22, at [548]. 
59 Mangin v Comissioner of Inland Revenue [1971] NZLR 591 (PC). 
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If a bona fide business transaction can be carried through in two ways, 
one involving less liability to tax than the other, their Lordships do not 
think sec 108 can properly be invoked to declare the transaction wholly 
or partly void merely because the way involving less tax is chosen.  
Indeed, in the case of a company, it may be the duty of the directors vis a 
vis their shareholders to so act. 
 
The High Court in Challenge Corporation Limited v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue quoted this statement,60 although this case was 
appealed to the Privy Council and the Privy Council did not refer to 
this statement.61  
Finally, although it has been appreciated that a company’s tax 
planning can harm the company’s reputation,62 it is not clear whether 
tax planning can harm the company’s reputation in a way that is 
actually detrimental to the company’s business.  That is, the fact that 
the company’s tax planning might risk, for example, harming the 
company’s reputation or being found to be tax avoidance, does not 
necessarily mean that this tax planning is not in the company’s best 
interests.  This is demonstrated in the Westpac case.  Harrison J held 
that Westpac had engaged in tax avoidance and upheld the IRD’s 
assessment of Westpac’s liability at NZD 586,000,000.  
Notwithstanding, this decision did not appear to have any material 
impact on Westpac’s business.  The decision did not impact 
Westpac’s share value.63    
This reasoning demonstrates that the company has competing 
interests in regard to its tax planning.  That is, it is in the company’s 
best interests to minimise the company’s tax obligation but it is also in 
the company’s best interests to reduce the company’s exposure to the 
financial costs that are associated with filing an incorrect tax position.  
This means that any decision that the company’s directors make in 
regard to the company’s tax planning can be attacked as not being in 
the company’s best interests.   
Notwithstanding, it is still arguable that it is in the company’s best 
interests that the company’s directors understand the company’s tax 
planning.  This is so because, even though directors that understand 
                                                        
60 Challenge Corporation Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1984) 6 NZTC 62,808 
(HC).  
61 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 513 (PC). 
62 Westpac, above n 22, at [86]. 
63 Niko Kloeten “Westpac loses $900 million tax avoidance case” The National Business 
Review (online ed, New Zealand, 8 October 2009).   
21   
 
tax planning are not able to make decisions about the tax planning that 
are in the company’s best interests, directors that understand tax 
planning are able to make decisions about the tax planning that better 
balance these competing interests.  That is, the directors would be able 
to make decisions that balance the company’s interests to minimise its 
tax obligations against the company’s interests to reduce the risk that 
the IRD will challenge its tax position, in a manner that is consistent 
with how the company would balance each of these interests. 
Therefore, there is a strong argument that it is in the company’s 
best interests that the company’s directors understand the company’s 
tax planning.  For this reason, it is arguable that a duty to understand 
tax planning could also fit within s 131.   
3 Enforcement of the statutory directors’ duties  
The main problem with using the existing directors’ duties in the 
Companies Act to implement a duty to understand tax planning 
concerns how these duties are enforced.  Section 301 allows for a 
global enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties.64  If in the course 
of liquidation the court finds that the director has breached a duty, the 
court has discretion to order that the director contribute to the 
company’s assets by way of compensation as the court thinks just.65  It 
has been held that the appropriate method for assessing the amount of 
liability is to require that the director’s liability to contribute to the 
assets of the company be neither more nor less than that director’s just 
desserts.66  The problem with the approach to enforcing the directors’ 
duties in the Companies Act is that these duties are generally only 
enforced when the company is insolvent.  The company is only going 
to enforce these duties if doing so will benefit the company.  
Therefore, the company might bring a claim against the directors for 
breach of these duties when the company is insolvent because if the 
claim is successful, then the directors might be required to personally 
contribute to the company’s assets by way of compensation, and this 
will increase the pool of assets available to distribute to the company’s 
creditors and shareholders.  But if the company is not insolvent, then 
there is no need to bring a claim against the directors for breach of 
duties because there has been no harm to the company.   
                                                        
64 Re Cellar House Ltd (in liquidation) (2009) 15 NZBLQ 3 at [223].  
65 Companies Act, s 301.  
66 Nippon Express (New Zealand) Ltd v Woodward & Hutt (1998) 8 NZCLC 261,765 at [24]; 
and see also Fatupaito v Bates [2001] 3 NZLR 386 at [93].  
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This is a problem because if directors breach the duty to understand 
tax planning, but there is no harm to the company as a result (for 
example, if the company does not become insolvent) then this breach 
might not be enforced.  Therefore, if this duty was included within 
one of the existing directors’ duties in the Companies Act, this duty 
would not always be enforced.  This reduces the effectiveness of the 
duty at ensuring that directors understand their companies’ tax 
planning because there is less likely to be consequences for breaching 
the duty.  For this reason, even if the existing statutory directors’ 
duties could be used to implement a duty to understand tax planning 
there is limited value to be gained from including it within one of 
these duties. 
B Would Parliament Enact a Separate Duty to Understand 
Tax Planning?  
The difficulties in trying to include a duty to understand tax planning 
within the existing statutory directors’ duties, coupled with the limited 
value to be gained from doing so, indicate that it is not suitable to try 
to fit the duty to understand tax planning within the existing duties.  
Instead, it is more suitable to enact an express directors’ duty to 
understand tax planning.  This duty would be a separate duty that 
would sit alongside the existing statutory directors’ duties.  There is 
no directors’ duty to understand tax planning either in New Zealand 
legislation or at common law.  Therefore, Parliament would have to 
enact legislation to create a separate duty to understand tax planning.  
This duty could possibly be included either in the Companies Act, or 
alternatively in the Income Tax Act.  This part of the paper evaluates 
whether Parliament would enact a separate directors’ duty to 
understand tax planning.  This part first looks at how this duty should 
be enforced, to whom this duty should be owed to, and what should be 
the scope of this duty.  This part then considers the likelihood that 
Parliament would enact legislation to enact this duty.  
1 How should the duty be enforced?  
Like the approach to enforcing the directors’ duties in the Companies 
Act, it is appropriate that directors should be personally liable to the 
company for breaching the duty to understand tax planning by failing 
to understand this tax planning.  This will deter directors from failing 
to understand this tax planning in the future.   
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However, this duty is only effective at ensuring that directors 
understand their companies’ tax planning if it is enforced.  The 
director’s company will only enforce this duty against the director if 
there is some benefit to the company in doing so.  Therefore, there 
needs to be a reason to enforce the duty.  The company might enforce 
this duty if the company incurred a shortfall penalty for its tax 
position.  Shortfall penalties can be imposed on the company for filing 
an incorrect tax position.  The IRD can charge shortfall penalties on 
top of the company’s normal tax obligation.  The shortfall penalty is a 
percentage of the tax shortfall (deficit or understatement of tax), that 
results from certain actions by the employer.67  Shortfall penalties can 
be imposed for: lack of reasonable care (20 per cent); unacceptable tax 
position (20 per cent); gross carelessness (40 per cent); abusive tax 
position (100 per cent) and evasion (150 per cent).  The extent of the 
shortfall penalty depends on the taxpayer’s position.  For example, the 
penalty payable for taking an abusive tax position is 100 per cent of 
the resulting tax shortfall.68  These penalties are a debt of the company 
that is owed to the IRD.  Therefore, the company might bring a claim 
against the directors for breaching the duty to understand tax planning 
when the company has incurred a shortfall penalty because if the 
claim is successful, then the directors might be held personally liable 
for that penalty rather than the company.  That is, if the claim is 
successful then the company can recover the cost of the penalty from 
the company’s directors.  To give an example, this would mean that if 
a director has breached this duty, and the director’s company has 
taken an abusive tax position
69
 and as a result has incurred a shortfall 
penalty for taking that tax position, then the director could become 
personally liable for that penalty.   
To permit this duty to be enforced if the company has incurred a 
shortfall penalty for its tax position also addresses one of the problems 
with using the existing statutory directors’ duties to implement a duty 
to understand tax planning.  This problem is that the existing statutory 
directors’ duties are generally only enforced when the company is 
insolvent.  To permit this duty to be enforced if the company has 
incurred a shortfall penalty addresses this problem because it means 
                                                        
67 Inland Revenue Department Taxpayer obligations, interest and penalties (IR40, April 
2013) at 25. 
68 Tax Administration Act 1994, s 141D(3).  
69 Section 141D(7). 
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that this duty might be enforced in order to recover that shortfall 
penalty from the directors even if the company is still solvent after it 
has incurred this penalty.  Thus, this duty might be enforced in 
situations other than when the company is insolvent. 
2 Who should the duty be owed to?  
The duty to understand the company’s tax planning should be owed to 
the company.  This is appropriate because a breach of this duty can 
harm the company, for example, if the company incurred a shortfall 
penalty for its tax position.  This means that the company has a reason 
to enforce a breach of the duty so that the company can recover the 
cost of that penalty from the company’s directors.   
3 What should be the scope of the duty? 
The scope of the duty to understand tax planning depends on the level 
of understanding of this tax planning that directors need to have to 
satisfy this duty.  The case law on the director’s duty of care provides 
some guidance on what level of understanding should be required of 
directors.  For example, the NSW Court of Appeal in Daniels v AWA 
Ltd required that a director acquire a basic understanding of the 
business of the company and be familiar with the fundamentals of the 
company’s business.70  Similarly, Heath J in R v Moses (Nathans 
Finance) stated that, “[f]or example, a director of a finance company 
should be expected to know that a “current asset” is one expected to 
be realised within one year.”71  The example that the High Court used 
is very simple – most of the classifications and disclosures in a 
company’s financial statements are more complicated than this.  
Therefore, these cases suggest that directors need only a basic level of 
understanding of the company’s business (and in the case of finance 
company directors, of the company’s financial statements) to satisfy 
the duty of care.  It follows then that the level of understanding of tax 
planning that directors need to satisfy the duty to understand tax 
planning should be similar.  That is, directors should only need to 
have a basic level of understanding of their companies’ tax planning.  
                                                        
70Daniels v AWA Ltd, above n 44, at 61.  
71 R v Moses HC Auckland CRI-2009-004-1388, 8 July 2011 [Nathans Finance] at [83]. 
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4 What is the likelihood that Parliament would enact such a 
duty?  
A duty to understand tax planning could only be implemented if 
Parliament decided to enact legislation to implement this duty.  It is 
not clear whether Parliament would do this.  Legislatures in other 
jurisdictions have been receptive to enacting legislation that expands 
the scope of directors’ duties.  That is, legislation that imposes 
obligations on directors that are more onerous than the prior 
obligations on directors.  For example, the United Kingdom enacted a 
duty in its Companies Act 2006 that requires directors to have regard 
to matters including, among others, the interests of the company's 
employees, the need to foster the company's business relationships 
with suppliers, customers and others and the impact of the company's 
operations on the community and the environment.72  Section 172 sets 
out that:73 
 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst 
other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
 
The directors’ duty to understand their companies’ tax planning also 
expands the scope of directors’ duties because it requires directors to 
understand more of their companies’ matters (that is, more than just 
their companies’ trading activities).  The introduction of s 172 
demonstrates that legislatures have been willing to introduce similar 
duties.  Therefore, the introduction of this section indicates that 
enacting legislation to implement a duty to understand the company’s 
tax planning would not be out of line with the development of 
                                                        
72 Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 172.  
73 Section 172.  
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directors’ duties in other jurisdictions.   It also indicates that the New 
Zealand Parliament might be receptive to the idea of enacting 
legislation to implement this duty.    
There is, however, evidence that suggests that Parliament would 
not be receptive to the idea of enacting legislation that would expand 
the scope of directors’ duties.  The Health and Safety in Employment 
Act 1992 does not impose any direct duties on either the board of 
directors or individual directors.  The Royal Commission on the Pike 
River Coal Mine Tragedy suggested that the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act should be amended to include a statutory duty 
requiring directors to play their part at the governance level in 
ensuring that the company has an effective health and safety 
management system.
74
  (The Royal Commission did not however 
make a formal recommendation that such a duty be imposed).  The 
Royal Commission described the section in the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act that deals with the liability of directors in relation to 
offences committed by their companies75 as ineffective76 because it 
requires that the director has actively participated in making decisions 
in relation to the circumstances resulting in the incident.  The section 
is therefore less likely to catch the directors of larger companies, 
because these directors have normally delegated to executive 
management the operational decisions that give rise to breaches of 
health and safety.77  That is, these directors are more removed from 
the company’s day-to-day operations, and therefore the company’s 
incidents.  It is thus clear from the Royal Commission’s analysis that 
it wants to directly impose on the company’s directors the 
responsibility for ensuring the company has a healthy and safe 
workplace.  The Report of the Independent Task Force on Workplace 
Health and Safety also recommended that duties should extend to all 
those in governance roles.78  Notwithstanding, the government did not 
follow through with these suggestions and amend the Health and 
Safety in Employment Act to introduce a statutory directors’ duty.  
This is reflected in the Health and Safety (Pike River Implementation) 
                                                        
74 Graham Panckhurst, Stewart Bell and David Henry Royal Commission on the Pike River 
Coal Mine Tragedy: Volume 2 (October 2012) at 326.  
75 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 56.  
76 Panckhurst, Bell and Henry, above n 74, at 326.  
77 Panckhurst, Bell and Henry, above n 74, at 326.  
78 Independent Task Force on Workplace Health and Safety The Report of the Independent 
Task Force on Workplace Health and Safety: Executive Report (April 2013) at 4. 
27   
 
Bill,79 which does not mention anything about directors’ duties.  This 
is so, even though such an amendment would bring New Zealand’s 
work health and safety legislation into line with the Australian 
legislation.  Instead, the government issued a set of directors’ 
guidelines on health and safety following the Royal Commission’s 
report, which refers to the due diligence obligations on directors set 
out in the Australian Work Health and Safety Act 201180 and the 
reasonable steps that directors are required to take to exercise due 
diligence.81  The guidelines state that:82 
 
Boards and directors should aspire to move beyond compliance to ‘best 
practice’ – an approach that has shown results superior to those achieved 
by other means and that is used as a benchmark. 
 
The example from the United Kingdom can be contrasted with this 
example, where the New Zealand government demonstrated that it 
was not willing to introduce more expansive directors’ duties.  This 
example thus indicates that the New Zealand government might be 
reluctant to impose formal obligations on directors that are more 
onerous than the obligations directors currently have.  Instead, the 
government seems to prefer that any additional obligations would be 
only informal and non-binding, that is for example, only in guidelines 
rather than in legislation.   For this reason, Parliament might not be 
receptive to the idea of enacting legislation to implement a duty to 
understand tax planning because such a duty imposes more 
obligations on directors.  This duty imposes more obligations because 
it requires directors to understand more about their companies’ 
matters. 
It is therefore unclear exactly how receptive Parliament might be to 
the idea of enacting legislation to implement a duty to understand tax 
planning.  The fact that the government chose not to implement a 
directors’ duty in relation to work health and safety, despite the 
position in Australia and the clear recommendations to do so, suggests 
that the government is also unlikely to implement a directors’ duty to 
                                                        
79 Health and Safety (Pike River Implementation) Bill 2013 (130-2).  
80 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Australia), s 27(1).  
81 Section 27(5). 
82 Institute of Directors in New Zealand and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment Good Governance Practices Guideline for Managing Health and Safety Risks 
(May 2013) at 6. 
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understand tax planning.  This conclusion is further supported by the 
fact that the proposed directors’ duty in relation to work health and 
safety is similar to a duty to understand tax planning because it also 
sought to impose more onerous obligations on directors.   
For these reasons, it is unlikely that a duty to understand tax 
planning could successfully be implemented in New Zealand law.  
There are difficulties in trying to include this duty within the existing 
statutory duties, and there is also limited value to be gained from 
doing so.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that Parliament would enact 
legislation to create an express statutory duty to understand tax 
planning.  It appears that the New Zealand Parliament is unwilling to 
expand the scope of directors’ duties through legislation, and this is 
exactly what the legislature would be doing if it created a statutory 
duty to understand tax planning.  
IV Is it Appropriate to Impose on Directors a Duty to 
Understand Tax Planning? 
Even if a duty to understand tax planning could be implemented into 
New Zealand law, it is important to consider whether it is appropriate 
to impose this duty on directors.  This part of the paper evaluates 
whether it is appropriate to impose on directors a duty to understand 
tax planning by examining whether this duty is reasonable, whether 
this duty is comparable to directors’ obligations and liability in other 
areas of regulation, and whether there are already existing 
mechanisms in place to encourage directors to understand tax 
planning.  
A Is it Reasonable to Expect Directors to Understand their 
Companies’ Tax Planning? 
It is not appropriate to impose on directors a duty to understand their 
companies’ tax planning if it is not reasonable to expect directors to 
understanding this tax planning.  It is not reasonable to expect 
directors to understand every matter about their companies.  Instead, 
there are some matters that directors will have to rely on professional 
or expert advice in relation to.  These matters might, like tax planning, 
be important to the company, but are not matters that it is reasonable 
to expect directors to understand.  The reason why it is not reasonable 
to expect directors to understand these matters might be because it 
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would require directors to have more knowledge in the matter than it 
is reasonable to expect directors to have.  For example, it is arguable 
that it is not reasonable to expect directors to understand the reason 
why opaque milk bottles keep milk fresher for longer because to 
expect directors to understand this matter would require directors to 
have more knowledge in chemistry than it is reasonable to expect 
directors to have.  In addition, if directors were expected to understand 
these matters, then this expectation would increase the standard as to 
what is required to be eligible to be appointed as a director, and would 
consequently reduce the pool of people that are able to be directors. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect directors to understand their 
companies’ tax planning.  Directors are usually intelligent, competent 
and business savvy.  Directors are also expected to have a degree of 
financial literacy and carefully read and understand their companies’ 
financial statements before signing-off, approving, or adopting these 
financial statements.83  These expectations mean that directors should 
know about basic accounting and financial concepts.  Therefore, this 
description of directors and directors’ knowledge demonstrates that 
directors are smarter and better informed than the average person.  For 
this reason, directors should both have the ability to understand tax 
planning and the knowledge of basic accounting and financial 
concepts that will help them to understand this planning.  This means 
that if a tax plan is carefully explained to directors it is reasonable to 
expect these directors to understand that plan.  Even though 
explaining a tax plan to directors might take a long time, this 
discussion shows that it is possible to successfully explain a tax plan 
to directors.   
B Is a Duty to Understand Tax Planning Consistent with 
Directors’ Obligations and Liability in Other Areas of 
Regulation?  
It is also appropriate to impose on directors a duty to understand their 
companies’ tax planning if this duty is consistent with directors’ 
obligations and liability in other areas of regulation.  This part 
evaluates whether a duty to understand tax planning is consistent with 
directors’ obligations and liability in other areas of regulation by 
looking at whether the nature of this duty is consistent with the nature 
                                                        
83 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717, 196 FCR 
291 [Centro] at [15].  
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of the existing statutory directors’ duties, whether the directors’ 
liability for breaching this duty is consistent with the directors’ 
liability in other areas of regulation, and finally whether the size of the 
liability for breaching this duty is consistent with the size of the 
liability for breaching other obligations. 
1 Is the nature of this duty consistent with the nature of the 
existing statutory directors’ duties?  
Directors’ duties recognise that in some situations the directors’ 
interests may diverge from their companies’ interests.84  For example, 
the directors’ and companies’ interests may diverge when directors act 
with insufficient care or diligence in relation to the company’s 
business operations.85  Therefore, the purpose of directors’ duties is to 
align the directors’ actions with their companies’ interests.
86
  For 
example, the purpose of the director’s duty of care in s 137 is to 
ensure that directors act with the level of care, diligence and skill that 
is in their companies’ interests.   
The directors’ and companies’ interests may also diverge when 
directors’ do not understand their companies’ tax planning.  It might 
not be in the directors’ interests to understand their companies’ tax 
planning because it could take a long time to understand this tax 
planning, particularly if this tax planning is complicated.   Instead, the 
directors might consider that it is in their interests to focus on 
something else and instead rely on external or professional advisers to 
understand this tax planning for them.  It might, however, be in the 
companies’ interests that directors’ understand their companies’ tax 
planning because it would help directors to make better informed 
decisions about their companies’ tax planning.  Moreover, it would 
help directors to make decisions about their companies’ tax planning 
that balance their companies’ interests to minimise their tax 
obligations against their companies’ interests to reduce the risk that 
the IRD will challenge their tax positions, in a manner that is 
consistent with how their companies would balance each of these 
interests.  Thus, the purpose of the duty to understand tax planning is 
to ensure that directors act in their companies’ interests by 
                                                        
84 Walker and Others Commercial Applications of Company Law in New Zealand (4th ed, 
CCH, Auckland, 2012) at [1202].  
85 At [1202]. 
86 At [1202]. 
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understanding their companies’ tax planning.  This purpose is 
consistent with the purpose of directors’ duties generally. 
Directors are required to understand various matters about their 
companies.  For example, the Federal Court of Australia in Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (Centro) held that 
directors are required to carefully read and understand their 
companies’ financial statements before exercising their responsibility 
to sign-off, approve, or adopt these statements.87  Also, Heath J in 
Nathans Finance held that it is “axiomatic that a director of a finance 
company will be assumed to have the ability to read and understand 
financial statements and the way in which assets and liabilities are 
classified.”88  His Honour then noted that this requirement 
“represent[s] no more than the basic level of understanding needed to 
run a finance company.”89  Furthermore, in Australia, directors and 
officers have a duty to exercise due diligence to ensure that their 
companies comply with any statutory duties or obligations they have 
under the Work Health and Safety Act.90  Due diligence includes 
taking reasonable steps to acquire and keep up-to-date knowledge of 
work health and safety matters, and to gain an understanding of the 
nature of the operations of the business or undertaking of the person 
conducting the business or undertaking and generally of the hazards 
and risks associated with those operations.91  These examples 
demonstrate that the duty to understand tax planning, which also 
requires directors to understand another matter about their companies 
(that is, their companies’ tax planning), is consistent what is already 
required of directors.   
This conclusion is supported by the fact that directors are in some 
situations also required to understand their companies’ financial 
affairs.
92
   The company’s tax planning relates to the company’s 
financial affairs.  Specifically, the company’s tax planning involves 
arranging the company’s financial affairs so as to minimise the 
company’s tax obligation.  Furthermore, the company’s tax planning 
influences the financial information in the company’s financial 
statements and is ultimately represented in these financial statements 
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as the company’s tax expense.  Finally, the company’s tax planning 
and financial planning both use similar accounting and financial 
concepts (for example, income and expenditure).  This relationship 
thus demonstrates that there is not a big jump between requiring 
directors to understand their companies’ financial affairs and requiring 
directors to understand their companies’ tax planning.  For this reason, 
requiring directors to understand their companies’ tax planning is not 
wholly out of line with what is already required of directors.      
2 Is the liability imposed on directors for breaching this duty is 
consistent with the liability imposed on directors in other 
areas of regulation?  
There are other areas of regulation, outside of tax law, that also 
impose obligations on directors, or alternatively, liability on directors 
for their companies’ actions.  It is arguable that it is appropriate to 
impose on directors a duty to understand tax planning if the liability 
imposed on directors for breaching this duty is consistent with the 
liability imposed on directors in other areas of regulation.  This paper 
looks at four other areas of regulation, namely: fair trading; 
competition; resource management; and work health and safety law.  
The starting point for comparing these obligations is that if directors 
breach a duty to understand tax planning they can become personally 
liable for any shortfall penalties imposed by the IRD on the directors’ 
companies.  These shortfall penalties are of a civil nature.  The fact 
that shortfall penalties are of a civil nature is material because it 
means that directors can become personally liable for penalties that 
only need to meet a relatively lower standard of proof to be imposed, 
than penalties of a criminal nature, which must meet a higher standard 
of proof to be imposed.   
(a) Tax law 
Before looking at other areas of regulation, there are also other 
obligations imposed on directors under tax law.  For example, in 
Australia, directors are responsible for ensuring that their companies 
meet their pay as you go withholding and superannuation guarantee 
charge obligations.  A director that fails to meet a pay as you go 
withholding93 or superannuation guarantee charge94 liability in full by 
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the due date automatically becomes personally liable for a penalty 
equal to the unpaid amount.  This example demonstrates that directors 
already owe obligations in regard to their companies’ tax affairs.  This 
example thus suggests that a duty to understand tax planning, which 
also imposes obligations on directors in regard to their companies’ tax 
affairs, is consistent with the obligations that directors already owe.  
However, it is arguable that these obligations can be distinguished.  
The reason for a duty to understand tax planning is to ensure that 
directors understand their companies’ tax planning.  In contrast, the 
reason for the directors’ responsibility to ensure that their companies 
meet their pay as you go withholding and superannuation guarantee 
charge obligations is to reduce the scope for companies to escape 
liabilities and payments of employee entitlements.
95
  The Australian 
Tax Office noted in its decision to impose penalties on superannuation 
guarantee charge obligations, in addition to pay as you go obligations, 
that:96 
 
Extending the director penalty regime to apply to unpaid super guarantee 
charge better secures workers’ entitlements. A director penalty can now 
arise from amounts of unpaid super guarantee charge that should have 
been paid to a super fund for the benefit of the employee.  
 
This statement reveals that the directors’ responsibility to ensure that 
their companies meet their pay as you go withholding and 
superannuation guarantee charge obligations focuses on a narrow and 
specific issue: ensuring that companies’ pay employee entitlements.  
For this reason, it is equally arguable that a duty to understand tax 
planning is different to the directors’ responsibility to ensure that their 
companies meet their pay as you go withholding and superannuation 
guarantee charge obligations.  The fact that these obligations can be 
distinguished thus means that it is difficult to successfully establish 
that the duty to understand tax planning is consistent with the other 
obligations that directors owe in regard to their companies’ tax affairs.     
(b) Fair trading law 
In New Zealand, the Fair Trading Act 1986 prohibits persons, in trade, 
from engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely 
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to mislead or deceive.97  The majority in the Court of Appeal in Body 
Corporate v Taylor held that liability under this section could extend 
to a person who was not in trade directly on his or her own account, 
but rather was acting as a director or senior employee of the company 
that was in trade.
98
  This means that directors of a company that 
engages in misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to trade could 
become personally liable for breaches of the Fair Trading Act.  
Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ, however, disagreed with the majority 
and found that, ordinarily, people who are not themselves in trade are 
not liable under the Fair Trading Act, unless they knowingly aid and 
abet infringements.99   
The liability that can be imposed on directors under the Fair 
Trading Act is similar to the liability that can be imposed on directors 
under a duty to understand tax planning.  The liability that can be 
imposed under these obligations is similar because they are both of a 
civil nature.  That is, a breach of either obligation gives rise to civil, 
not criminal, remedies.  A breach of s 9, which prohibits persons in 
trade from engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct, is not a 
criminal offence within s 40 of the Fair Trading Act, and therefore 
does not give rise to a criminal sanction.  Instead, a breach of this 
section gives rise to wide-ranging civil remedies under ss 41,42 and 
43 of the Fair Trading Act.100  These civil remedies include 
injunctions granted by the court101 and orders to disclose information 
or publish advertisements.102  Similarly, the shortfall penalties that 
directors can become personally liable for if they breach a duty to 
understand tax planning are civil, not criminal, penalties.
103
  This 
similarity demonstrates that the liability imposed on directors under a 
duty to understand tax planning is consistent with the liability that is 
imposed on directors under fair trading law.   
(c) Competition law 
Directors may face consequences when their companies’ breach 
competition law.  However, these consequences differ depending on 
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the jurisdiction in which the breach of competition law occurs.  In the 
United Kingdom, firms may face a financial penalty of up to 10 per 
cent104 of their worldwide turnover for breaching competition law.105  
Directors, however, cannot become personally liable for these 
penalties.  The United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Safeway Stores 
Ltd v Twigger held that a company could not recover from its 
directors penalties imposed on the company for breaching competition 
law.106  In this case, Safeway, a supermarket chain, had admitted its 
own participation in a cartel, and wanted to recover the €10,700,000 
penalty imposed on it by the Office of Fair Trading from 11 of its 
former directors and employees who were alleged to have been 
responsible for getting it into the cartel in the first place.107  Instead, a 
director can be disqualified from being a director under a Competition 
Disqualification Order if the court is satisfied that his or her company 
has committed a breach of competition law and the director’s conduct 
in connection with that infringement makes him unfit to be concerned 
in the management of a company.108 
In Australia, a person that suffers loss or damage as a result of a 
contravention of certain provisions in the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (which prohibits various anti-competitive practices) may 
recover that loss or damage from the directors of a company, but only 
if the directors were involved in the contravention.109  Directors are 
involved in the contravention if they have intentionally participated in 
the contravention.110  This means that they must have: aided, abetted, 
counselled or procured the contravention; induced, whether by threats 
or promises or otherwise, the contravention; been in any way, directly 
or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; 
or have conspired with others to effect the contravention.111  For 
example, the Federal Court of Australia in Norcast v Bradken Limited 
(No. 2) held that Bradken Ltd and two of its directors were liable for 
damages of USD 22,400,000, pre-judgment interest of USD 
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2,940,690.41 and post-judgment interest and costs,112 for their 
involvement in cartel conduct and misleading and deceptive 
conduct.113   
Finally, in New Zealand, the court may impose a pecuniary penalty 
on an individual who has either: contravened any of the provisions of 
Part 2 of the Commerce Act 1986 (which regulates restrictive trade 
practices); attempted to contravene such a provision; aided, abetted, 
counselled, or procured any other person to contravene such a 
provision; induced, or attempted to induce, any other person, whether 
by threats or promises or otherwise, to contravene such a provision; 
been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or 
party to, the contravention by any other person of such a provision; or 
conspired with any other person to contravene such a provision, unless 
the court considers that there is good reason for not doing so.114  
Mallon and Stevens suggested that possible good reasons for not 
imposing a penalty could be if the offending was not deliberate, the 
individual took and followed legal advice before acting, or the 
individual played only a minor role in the prohibited conduct.
115
  The 
maximum pecuniary penalty for an individual is NZD 500,000.116  
The standard of proof required to establish liability for this penalty is 
the civil standard.
117
  The court may also make an order that a person 
not be concerned with or take part in the management of a body 
corporate for a period not exceeding five years if the court is satisfied 
that the person has engaged in price fixing or is giving effect to or 
entering into an exclusionary provision.118 
There is no consistent approach to directors’ liability across 
jurisdictions. In Australia, directors can become personally liable for 
the loss or damage that results from their companies’ breach of 
competition law.  However, in the United Kingdom, directors cannot 
become personally liable for any penalties imposed on their 
companies for breaching competition law, and in New Zealand, 
directors can only become liable for a civil penalty for being involved 
in the breach of competition law.  Despite this, there are similarities 
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between the approach to directors’ liability under a duty to understand 
tax planning and the approaches to directors’ liability under 
competition law.  First, New Zealand’s approach is similar because it 
permits directors to become personally liable for civil penalties.  
Australia’s approach is also similar because it permits directors to 
become personally liable for loss or damage that their companies 
would otherwise be liable for.  In addition, it has been noted that the 
focus under New Zealand competition law is on penalising individuals 
within a firm who are responsible for making the decisions that lead to 
conduct in breach of the Commerce Act.
119
  The focus under a duty to 
understand tax planning is similar.  That is, the focus under this duty 
is on penalising directors who are responsible for making decisions 
about their companies’ tax planning which lead to tax positions that 
incur shortfall penalties, if they do not understand this tax planning.  
Therefore, it is arguable that because of the similarities between the 
approach to directors’ liability under a duty to understand tax planning 
and the approaches to directors’ liability under competition law, the 
liability imposed on directors under a duty to understand tax planning 
is consistent with the liability imposed on directors under competition 
law.   
However, there are also differences between the approach to 
directors’ liability under a duty to understand tax planning and the 
approaches to directors’ liability under competition law that 
undermine the persuasiveness of this argument.  First, the director’s 
liability under New Zealand competition law is in addition to any 
penalties that are imposed on the director’s company for breaching 
competition law.  Similarly, the director’s liability under Australian 
competition law sits alongside the director’s company’s liability for 
the breach of competition law.  This is illustrated in Norcast v 
Bradken, where both Bradken Ltd and two of its directors were held 
liable together for damages of USD 22,400,00 plus interests and 
costs120 for breaching competition law.  This means that both the 
company and the company’s directors can be liable for the same 
conduct that breached competition law.  In contrast, the director’s 
liability for shortfall penalties for breaching the duty to understand tax 
planning is in replacement of the company’s liability for these 
penalties.  That is, the directors, if they breach this duty, are liable for 
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these shortfall penalties instead of their companies.  This difference 
thus undermines the argument that the liability imposed on directors 
under a duty to understand tax planning is consistent with the liability 
imposed on directors under competition law.  
The further difficulty with this is argument is the fact that the 
United Kingdom Court of Appeal’s decision in Safeway Stores v 
Twigger appears to rejects the very thing that a breach of a duty to 
understand tax planning would permit, that is, that a company could 
recover from its directors a civil penalty imposed on the company.  In 
this case, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Safeway 
could recover from its directors the penalty imposed on the company 
for breaching competition law.121  This case, therefore, suggests that 
the liability imposed on directors under a duty to understand tax 
planning is not consistent with the liability that is imposed on 
directors under competition law.  It may, however, be possible to 
distinguish this case from the directors’ liability under a duty to 
understand tax planning.  Pill L.J. noted that the policy of the 
Competition Act 1998 is to protect the public, and this policy would 
be undermined if firms were able to pass on the liability to their 
employees, or the employees’ directors and officers’ insurers.122  That 
is, the public would only be protected if the firm itself bears the 
responsibility and consequence for breaching the Competition Act.123  
In contrast, the imposition of personal liability on directors for the 
company’s shortfall penalties for breaching a duty to understand tax 
planning is for the benefit of the directors’ companies, and not to 
protect the public.  Therefore, there is no similar policy reason for 
ensuring that the company itself bears the liability for these penalties.   
This examination of some of the approaches to directors’ liability 
under competition law reveals that it is not clear whether the liability 
imposed on directors under a duty to understand tax planning is 
consistent with the liability imposed on directors under competition 
law.  Australian and New Zealand competition law permits directors 
to become personally liable, in some manner, for breaches of 
competition law, but this liability sits alongside the director’s 
company’s liability for these breaches, not in replacement of this 
liability.  This is inconsistent with the nature of the directors’ liability 
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under a duty to understand tax planning.  Furthermore, United 
Kingdom competition law does not permit companies to recover from 
their directors any civil penalties imposed on the company.  Thus, 
United Kingdom competition law is also inconsistent with a duty to 
understand tax planning because it rejects the very thing that a duty to 
understand tax planning would permit.  However, the fact that the 
reasoning for the decision in Safeway Stores v Twigger does not apply 
to the duty to understand tax planning means that it is possible to 
argue that this rejection should not apply outside of a competition law 
context.   
For these reasons, although not one of the approaches to directors’ 
liability under competition law provides an exact analogy to the 
approach to directors’ liability under a duty to understand tax 
planning, these approaches share some similarities with the approach 
to directors’ liability under a duty to understand tax planning.  These 
similarities therefore suggest that the liability imposed on directors 
under a duty to understand tax planning is not wholly out of line with 
the liability imposed on directors under competition law.   
(d) Resource management law 
In New Zealand, where a company is convicted of an offence under 
the Resource Management Act 1991, the company’s directors and 
management might also be convicted of that offence, if it can be 
shown that that the offence took place with their authority or consent 
and they knew or should have known of the offence but failed to take 
all reasonable steps to stop it.124  For example, in R v Kiwi Drilling Co 
Ltd and Smith (Kiwi Drilling) the company’s director was initially 
fined NZD 53,000, but this fine was reduced on appeal to NZD 
15,000.125 
The liability that can be imposed on directors under a duty to 
understand tax planning is different to the liability that can be imposed 
on directors under the Resource Management Act.  The director’s 
liability for shortfall penalties under a duty to understand tax planning 
is in replacement of the company’s liability for these penalties.  In 
contrast, the director’s liability in relation to the offence under the 
Resource Management Act is in addition to the company’s liability for 
that offence.  This difference demonstrates that the liability imposed 
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on directors under a duty to understand tax planning is not consistent 
with the liability that is imposed on directors under resource 
management law.   
(e) Work health and safety law 
In Australia, directors and officers have a duty to exercise due 
diligence to ensure that their companies comply with any statutory 
duties or obligations they have under the Work Health and Safety 
Act.126  Directors may face criminal penalties for breaching this 
duty.127  Due diligence includes taking reasonable steps to acquire and 
keep up-to-date knowledge of work health and safety matters, and to 
gain an understanding of the nature of the operations of the business 
or undertaking of the person conducting the business or undertaking 
and generally of the hazards and risks associated with those 
operations.128  
In New Zealand, directors have no express duties under the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act.  Rather, where a body corporate fails 
to comply with a provision of the Act, any of its officers, directors, or 
agents who directed, authorised, assented to, acquiesced in, or 
participated in, the failure is a party to and guilty of the failure and is 
liable on conviction to the punishment provided for the offence, 
whether or not the body corporate has been prosecuted or 
convicted.129  Where the Health and Safety in Employment Act is 
breached and serious harm is caused, a fine not exceeding NZD 
50,000 may be imposed on directors.130  In other situations, fines of up 
to NZD 25,000 may be imposed.131  Furthermore, the government has 
issued a set of directors’ guidelines on health and safety, which refer 
to the due diligence obligations on directors in the Australian Work 
Health and Safety Act and the reasonable steps that directors are 
required to take to exercise due diligence.
132 
The directors’ duty to exercise due diligence in Australian law is 
similar to a duty to understand tax planning because it also imposes 
penalties on directors for failing to understand something about the 
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company.  Specifically, under this duty to exercise due diligence 
directors could be liable to penalties for failing to exercise due 
diligence by failing to gain an understanding of the hazards and risks 
associated with their companies’ operations.  Nonetheless, the liability 
that can be imposed on directors under both Australian and New 
Zealand work health and safety law is also different to the liability 
that can be imposed on directors under a duty to understand tax 
planning because the penalties that can be imposed on directors under 
these laws are of a criminal, rather than civil, nature.  This difference 
demonstrates that the liability imposed on directors under a duty to 
understand tax planning is not consistent with the liability that is 
imposed on directors under work health and safety law. 
(f) Conclusion 
The examination of the obligations and liability imposed on directors 
under other areas of regulation reveals that there is not one example of 
an obligation or liability imposed on directors under these other areas 
of regulation that provides an exact analogy to the liability imposed on 
directors under a duty to understand tax planning.  Instead, this 
examination reveals that there are several similarities between the 
liability under a duty to understand tax planning and the obligations 
and liability imposed on directors under other areas of regulation.  For 
example, under work health and safety law directors can become 
liable for failing to understand something about the company.  In 
addition, under fair trading and competition law directors can become 
liable for civil penalties.  These similarities illustrate that even though 
the exact nature of the liability imposed on directors under a duty to 
understand tax planning is unique, the nature of this liability is not 
wholly out of line with the liability imposed on directors under other 
areas of regulation.  For this reason, it is arguable that in a general 
sense the liability imposed on directors for breaching the duty to 
understand tax planning is consistent with the liability imposed on 
directors in other areas of regulation.  This argument thus supports the 
conclusion that it is appropriate to impose on directors a duty to 
understand their companies’ tax planning 
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3 Is the size of the directors’ liability for breaching a duty to 
understand tax planning consistent with the size of the 
directors’ liability for breaching other obligations? 
If a director has breached the duty to understand tax planning, then 
that director can become personally liable for any shortfall penalties 
imposed on the director’s company by the IRD.  These shortfall 
penalties might in some situations be substantial in size.  For example, 
in the Westpac case, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue held that 
the purpose or effect of Westpac’s transactions, or parts of these 
transactions, was tax avoidance, and assessed Westpac’s liability at 
NZD 586,000,000, before any penalties applied.133  The penalty 
payable for taking an abusive tax position is 100 per cent of the 
resulting tax shortfall.
134
  Therefore, if the Commissioner held that 
Westpac had taken an abusive tax position, then the size of the 
shortfall penalty that the Commissioner could impose in this case is 
NZD 586,000,000.   This appears to be a very large penalty to make 
directors personally liable for.  However, it is arguable that it is 
appropriate to make directors personally liable for these penalties if 
the size of this liability is consistent with the size of liabilities that 
directors might be able to become personally liable for under other 
areas of regulation.  
The difficulty with making this argument is that there are no 
examples of cases or statutes where directors could become personally 
liable for an amount that is comparable to the size of the shortfall 
penalties that directors could become personally liable for under a 
duty to understand tax planning.   For example, in the Commerce Act 
the maximum pecuniary penalty for an individual who breaches a 
provision in the Act is NZD 500,000.135  Also, in Kiwi Drilling the 
company’s director was fined only NZD 53,000 for breaches of the 
Resource Management Act, and this was reduced on appeal to NZD 
15,000.136  The most comparable example is Norcast v Bradken.  In 
this case, the Federal Court of Australia held that Bradken Ltd and 
two of its directors were liable for damages of USD 22,400,000 
million plus interest and costs for breaching competition law.
137
  
However, both the company and its directors were liable together for 
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this amount, and moreover, the size of this liability is still 
considerably smaller than the size of the shortfall penalties that 
directors could potentially become personally liable for under a duty 
to understand tax planning.   
Thus, the substantial difference between the size of the liability that 
might be imposed on directors for breaching a duty to understand tax 
planning and the size of the liability that might be imposed on 
directors for breaching other obligations demonstrates that these 
liabilities are not consistent.  For this reason, it is arguable that it is 
not appropriate to impose on directors a duty to understand their 
companies’ tax planning, because to do so could potentially make 
directors personally liable for any shortfall penalties imposed on the 
company, and to make directors personally liable for these penalties 
would be excessive and wholly out of line with the size of the 
liabilities that can currently be imposed on directors.      
C Are there Mechanisms in Place to Ensure that Directors 
Understand their Companies’ Tax Planning?  
It is not necessary to impose on directors a duty to understand their 
companies’ tax planning if the existing mechanisms in place to make 
directors accountable to their companies for their actions are sufficient 
to ensure that directors understand their companies’ tax planning.   
One example of an informal mechanism that makes directors 
accountable to their companies for their actions is director resignation.  
There have been several examples of directors resigning from their 
positions following their involvement in an incident that has harmed 
their companies’ reputation or financial performance.  For example, 
the managing director of Fonterra’s New Zealand manufacturing 
operations resigned following the botulism bacteria scare.138  This 
scare involved a potentially contaminated whey protein ingredient 
sold by Fonterra for use in baby formula, sports drinks, and animal 
foods.139  Similarly, both the chief executive officer and chairman of 
Barclays Bank’s resigned following the £290,000,000 fine imposed on 
Barclays by the United Kingdom and United States authorities for 
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trying to fix a key inter-bank interest rate.140  These examples 
demonstrate that resignation is one possible mechanism to make 
directors personally responsible for their actions, or conversely, their 
lack of actions.  There are, however, no similar examples of directors 
resigning from their positions in the context of company tax planning.  
For example, not one of the directors of Westpac or BNZ resigned 
following the Westpac and BNZ tax avoidance cases, despite the fact 
that these cases resulted in significant financial consequences for these 
banks.  In BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
approximately NZD 416,000,000 of tax hinged on the outcome of the 
proceedings,141 and in the Westpac case the total amount of tax at 
issue was NZD 961,000,000.142   
Therefore, it is arguable that the existing mechanisms in place are 
not sufficient to make directors accountable for their companies’ tax 
planning.  The corollary of this argument is that these mechanisms are 
not able to ensure that directors understand their companies’ tax 
planning.  For this reason, it necessary to impose on directors a duty to 
understand their companies’ tax planning to ensure that directors 
understand this tax planning.   
V Conclusion  
This paper focused on whether the commentary outlining what is 
expected of directors in regard to their companies’ tax planning both 
could and should be translated into obligations on the part of directors 
in regard to their companies’ tax planning.   
It is clear that directors should have a duty to understand their 
companies’ tax planning.  The difficulty, however, is whether this 
duty could be implemented into New Zealand law.  This paper 
focused on two possible avenues for implementing this duty into law.  
There are many reasons to indicate that this duty could fit within the 
existing directors’ duties in ss 131 and 137 of the Companies Act.  
The problem, however, is that there is limited value to be gained from 
fitting a duty to understand tax planning within these existing 
directors’ duties because they are generally only enforced when the 
company is insolvent, and it is possible that a director might breach a 
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duty to understand tax planning when the company is not insolvent.  
This would mean that there might be situations where the duty is 
breached, but the breach is not enforced.   Moreover, is also unlikely 
that the New Zealand Parliament would enact legislation to implement 
a separate duty to understand tax planning.  To enact legislation to 
implement a separate duty would address the problem with fitting the 
duty to understand tax planning within the existing directors’ duties.  
However, the fact that the government was not willing to enact 
legislation to create additional directors’ duties in relation to work 
health and safety indicates that Parliament would be unlikely to enact 
legislation in this situation.  Therefore, it is unlikely that a duty to 
understand tax planning could successfully be implemented into law 
in New Zealand.  This outcome might be different in other 
jurisdictions.  For example, both the United Kingdom and Australia 
have been more willing to enact legislation to create more onerous 
directors’ duties.  This is illustrated in the enactment of the United 
Kingdom Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Work Health and 
Safety Act 2011.   These examples suggest that it is more likely that 
the United Kingdom and Australia would enact legislation to 
implement a duty to understand tax planning.  
Even if, a duty to understand tax planning could be implemented 
into law, it is not clear whether it is appropriate to impose such a duty 
on directors.  It is reasonable to expect directors to understand tax 
planning because directors are equipped with both the ability and the 
knowledge to be able to understand tax planning.  Moreover, the 
nature of a duty to understand tax planning is consistent with the 
nature of the existing statutory directors’ duties.  This paper then 
compared this duty to directors’ obligations and liability under other 
areas of regulation.  There are no examples of directors’ obligations 
and liability under other areas of regulation that provide an exact 
analogy to a duty to understand tax planning.  Notwithstanding, these 
examples share some similarities with a duty to understand tax 
planning, and therefore indicate that a duty to understand tax planning 
is not out of line with existing directors’ obligations and liabilities.  
For this reason, this comparison suggests that it is appropriate to 
impose on directors a duty to understand tax planning.  The problem, 
however, is that the shortfall penalties that directors can become 
personally liable for under a duty to understand tax planning might in 
some situations be considerably greater in size than the liabilities that 
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directors can become personally liable for under other areas of 
regulation.  This difference suggests that it is not appropriate to 
impose on directors a duty to understand tax planning.  Finally, the 
fact that the existing mechanisms in place to make directors 
accountable to their companies for their actions are not sufficient to 
ensure that directors understand their companies’ tax planning 
suggests that it is necessary to impose a duty on directors a duty to 
understand tax planning.   
This examination suggests that although in most respects it is 
appropriate to impose on directors a duty to understand tax planning, 
it might not in some situations be appropriate to make directors 
personally liable for the total sum of the shortfall penalties.   In these 
situations, it might instead be more appropriate to make directors 
personally liable for a contribution towards the shortfall penalties.  To 
require directors to contribute to their companies’ shortfall penalties is 
also consistent with the nature of the director’s personal liability for 
breaches of the directors’ duties in the Companies Act.    
This paper thus demonstrates that although it is clear that directors 
should understand their companies’ tax planning, it is difficult to 
implement a legal duty that effectively ensures that directors 
understand their companies tax planning.  
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